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Marshall S. Shapo*
I. INTRODUCTION

I would like to discuss some major puzzles of human existence that
replicate themselves in tort law. This is a summary review of several major
issues in that body of law, which I think captures many of the high points of
how it relates to our lives, although I do not claim that it is inclusive of even
all the major issues. I have believed for some time that tort law is a fairly
accurate mirror of ourselves-our desires, our hopes and ambitions-and of
the attitudes that grow out of those elements of ourselves. It performs that
function within a sprawling, practical system of dispute resolution. As I
have said elsewhere, "it illustrates the complexities of our beliefs about the
value of industrial production and the protection of the environment," "it
reflects our views about our relationship to governments and officials," and
"it even informs us about our attitudes toward sports and games."' Beyond
that, tort law captures tensions within ourselves, exhibiting psychological
zones where we as individuals are "of two minds" about particularly
nettlesome issues.

* Marshall Shapo is the Frederic P. Vose Professor at Northwestern University School of Law.
1. MARSHALL S. SHAPO, PRINCIPLES OF TORT LAW 17-18 (3d ed. 2010).
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II.

ROLE AND RATIONALES

There are continuing arguments about the function tort law serves in
society. In a classic series of articles a half century ago, Dean Green
declared that tort law was public law in disguise. More recently, Professor
Goldberg, by contrast, favored a "private-law, wrongs-based conception of
tort law." 3 Whatever one's view is of the proper fundamental role of tort
law, it certainly has important links to various kinds of legislation, especially
compensation statutes and statutes regulating health and safety.
There are parallel disagreements about the rationales of tort law. Some
emphasize its compensatory effects.4 The question of what appropriate
compensation is generates difficulty even with respect to damages that
conventionally are viewed as economic in nature. One court awarded over
$2.5 million for lost wages to a claimant who had not yet graduated from
college, based on an expert's opinion that if the claimant had not been
injured he "would probably have graduated from college and completed two
years of graduate study." 5 The compensatory rationale links closely with the
concept of corrective justice, which focuses on a tightly viewed linkage of
the parties to an injury, excluding considerations of public policy.
Large amounts of ink have been spilled on the effects of tort law on
conduct. Few would disagree that it does affect primary behavior, although
two analysts have said that "[t]he effects of liability on both safety and
innovation seem to vary greatly among different parts of the U.S. economy
and society." 6 Some scholars, as well as many business persons, assert that
tort law significantly hampers desirable innovation.' Others argue that tort
law is insufficient to achieve a desirable amount of deterrence to undesirable
conduct.
Below the surface of doctrinal labels are arguments about reality and our
perceptions of reality. These disputes apply to our perceptions of risk,
which it has been pointed out is a socially-constructed concept, one that
develops "according to the logic and influence of institutions." 9 Certainly,
2. Leon Green, Tort Law Public Law in Disguise 1, 38 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1959); II, 38 TEX. L.
REV. 257 (1960).
3. John C.P. Goldberg, Tort Law for Federalists(and the Rest of Us): PrivateLaw in Disguise,
28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 3, 13-14 (2004).

4. See generally Tom Baker, Blood Money, New Money, and the Moral Economy of Tort Law in
Action, 35 L. & SOC'Y REV. 275 (2001).

5. Calva-Cerqueira v. United States, 281 F. Supp. 2d 279, 298-99 (D.D.C. 2003).
6. See generally Peter W. Huber & Robert E. Litan, Overview, in THE LIABILITY MAZE: TH4E
IMPACT OF LIABILITY LAW ON SAFETY AND INNOVATION 1, 1-25 (Peter W. Huber & Robert E.

Litan, eds., 1991).
7. See Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Torts and Innovation, 107 MICH. L. REV. 285, 298
(2008).
8. See, e.g., Richard L. Abel, A Critique of Torts, 37 UCLA L. REv. 785, 808-17 (1990).
9. Tom Baker & Jonathan Simon, Embracing Risk, in EMBRACING RISK: THE CHANGING
CULTURE OF INSURANCE AND RESPONSIBILITY 1, 19 (Tom Baker & Jonathan Simon eds., 2003).
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our perceptions of risk influence our legal treatment of dangers associated
with particular activities or products. It is well-accepted that the law must
take account of various kinds of tradeoffs, including tradeoffs between or
among various kinds of risks, and indeed among classes of persons.
Professor Porat has pointed out that holding a doctor liable for a technically
negligent decision during an operation "will increase to a significant extent
the risk that surgeons will practice defensive medicine in this type of
surgery," affecting many other patients. 10
There appears to be widespread agreement on the importance of
information in tort cases-both the availability of information and its
comprehensibility. This has become particularly apparent in two areas
featuring some of the most explosive litigation-and political content-in
our modem tort law: medical malpractice and products liability. In medical
malpractice, some of the salient issues concern the amount and quality of
information doctors give their patients. A particularly interesting issue,
which goes directly to the imbalance of power between the parties, concerns
the amount of experience that a doctor has with reference to a particular
procedure. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has declared that disclosure of
statistics on an inexperienced surgeon's record with an intricate procedure,
as compared with data on more experienced surgeons, would be "material to
the patient's exercise of an intelligent and informed consent."" One scholar
has suggested that "clinical innovation"-that is, therapies with "a decidedly
ad hoc or improvisational quality"-is the type of medical care for which
12
"fully informed consent seems particularly important."
A concept that probably is undertaught in basic legal education is
materiality. This is vital with respect to informed consent in medical cases.
It is also vital in products liability cases, where it becomes tied in with the
so-called heeding presumption. The New Jersey Supreme Court said in one
case that this presumption-namely that if there were a warning a plaintiff
"would have heeded it"-serves to reinforce the basic duty to warn, to
encourage manufacturers to produce safer products, and to alert users of the
13
hazards arising from the use of those products through effective warnings."
A theme that carries on through our present law-as it has for more than a
generation-is the importance of effective communication of risk
In one case, involving an
information, or of exculpatory clauses.

10. Ariel Porat, The Many Faces ofNegligence, 4 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 105, 113 (2003).
11. Johnson v. Kokemoor, 545 N.W.2d 495, 507 (Wis. 1996).
12. Lars Noah, Informed Consent and the Elusive Dichotomy Between Standard and
Experimental Therapy, 28 AM. J. L. & MED. 361, 391-94,408 (2002).
13. Coffman v. Keene Corp., 628 A.2d 710, 718 (N.J. 1993).
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exculpatory clause in a ticket for a cruise, the court said that even a
passenger who tried to understand the material on the ticket "would require
some legal and financial sophistication ... to research the liability limitation
reference." 1 4
We stand today on the edge of a cauldron of controversy involving
issues arising from the confrontation of law and science. Scientists, by an
ongoing process of falsification, attempt to discover what we may term as
"reality." For lawyers, however, reality is the product of a single trial
process rather than an endless investigative enterprise. The plethora of cases
swirling around Daubert5 presents a complicated modem motion picture of
lawyers wrestling with science. 16 As if defining "reality" were not enough
of a task, a substantial body of opinion contends that "factual" definitions of
cause travel only part of the way to the kinds of policy judgments that courts
must make.
A separate question, which has hovered on the theoretical horizon for
some time, concerns whether compensation should be awarded for increased
risk-for example, risk generated by exposure to toxic products. The New
Jersey Supreme Court, confronting the impact on a fetus of the failure of a
doctor to perform certain diagnostic tests after warning signs were brought
to his attention, said that plaintiffs would have to "demonstrate to a
reasonable medical probability that the failure to give the test increased the
risk of harm from [a] preexisting condition" rather than requiring proof of "a
reasonable degree of medical probability that [a] test would have resulted in
avoiding the harm."17 Thus, the way you phrase the question will influence
the answer-a point that is a truism for scientists as well as lawyers.
Power relationships are an important, if not always articulated, element
of tort law. One property of our modem law which is not usually
specifically mentioned in the decisions is what Professor Witt has called "a
culture of suspicion and distrust toward the hierarchical institutions" that
came "by the 1950s and 1960s to dominate large swaths of American life."'
The authors of the ALI's Enterprise Liability Study, with perhaps an edge of
scom, referred to attitudes of this kind in speaking of "the populist goal of
tort litigation."19 In the area of medical malpractice, there is at least a
residue of controversy about whether a "conspiracy of silence" still exists
that keeps physicians from testifying against one another. Surely one of the
leitmotifs in the area of medical torts-although, again, one not articulated

14. Wallis v. Princess Cruises, Inc., 306 F.3d 827, 837 (9th Cir. 2002).
15. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
16. See, e.g., 2 MARSHALL S. SHAPO, THE LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY I 23.01[1][a] (4th ed.
2001 & Supps. 2002-2009).
17. Gardner v. Pawliw, 696 A.2d 599, 615 (N.J. 1997).
18. John Fabian Witt, Speedy Fred Taylor and the Ironies ofEnterpriseLiability, 103 COLUM. L.
REv. 1,46 (2003).
19.
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in the cases-is a suspicion generated by the power naturally wielded by
physicians in situations where patients are almost entirely ignorant of the
medical premises on which treatment decisions are made.
III. LIABILITY DOCTRINES
At the surface of these realities, disagreements about tort law rear up
concerning the very labels used to describe basic concepts. It is second
nature to lawyers, and particularly law professors, to view liability doctrines
on a spectrum that ranges from intentional torts through the murky boundary
territory of recklessness, continues with negligence, and ends with strict
liability and absolute liability. This spectrum of doctrinal language uses
words familiar to laypersons, but which have special, if not always welldefined meanings in the law of torts.
In any event, these doctrines are very real for lawyers, although
questions frequently arise whether it is possible to define them in a way that
is meaningful to juries, whose interpretation of those concepts will make a
difference in outcomes. We know that the "intentional" tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress includes a recklessness element. It takes
some time to explain to first-year students the entangled verbiage that
underlies the definition of intentionality for battery.20 The two famous child
defendants--George Putney and Brian Dailey-have turned what in street
talk is a fairly understandable term into a technical definition of doctrine.2 1
Parallel to that is the blurring of the distinction between outright
misrepresentation and nondisclosure in cases in which defendants do not
reveal to sex partners the fact that they suffer from transmissible diseases.22

Further down the spectrum of doctrine is the term "gross negligence."23
Another illustration of the elasticity of language is the term "willful
misconduct," which has been the subject of litigation under the Warsaw

Convention, the international agreement covering injuries on airplanes.
Some disputes under the Convention have focused on such questions as

what an airline employee "must have known" about the risks to a man who
was allergic to smoke but whom flight attendants refused to allow to go to
20. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM

§ 1 (2010).
21. See Vosburg v. Putney, 50 N.W. 403 (Wis. 1891); Garratt v. Dailey, 279 P.2d 1091 (Wash.
1955).
22. Cf Barbara A. v. John G., 193 Cal. Rptr. 422 (Ct. App. 1983) (misrepresentation about
sterility).
23. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM §
2 cmt. a (2010) ("Taken at face value, this term simply means negligence that is especially bad.
Given this literal interpretation, gross negligence carries a meaning that is less than recklessness.").
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another seat.24

In negligence law, definitions and doctrinal content are more
controversial than ever. There are all kinds of definitions of negligence.
The one in the Second Restatement focuses on conduct, 25 and the one in the
Third Restatement focuses on risk.26

Heaven v. Pender rests on a

framework of duty derived from the relationship of the parties. There are
several other definitions. Even further down the spectrum of culpability, the
judgment that an actor was guilty of a "very slight negligence" appears in
the doctrine, borrowed from Roman law, of culpa levissima.2 8
Tort law may be said to be common law in two ways-in the technical
legal sense, but also in the sense of a law that can be appreciated by common
laymen. Instructed in no more than one of the basic Restatement definitions,
a lay person might be able to decide whether a particular defendant's
conduct in identified circumstances was negligent. Yet the law becomes
more uncommon when we adduce tests with what at least superficially
seems a quantitative aspect, like the risk-benefit test 29 and the Learned Hand
test.30
Here we encounter ongoing confrontation about whether
economically-based tests or morally-based standards should rule. At least
we can say that the Learned Hand test smells more of the lamp than of
practical decision-making by judges.
Strict liability for especially dangerous activities-"ultrahazardous" in
the First Restatement3 2 and "abnormally dangerous" in the Second-has
presented a most interesting historical circuitry. In the First Restatement,
the test was relatively spare. The Second Restatement complicated the
definition with a six-factor catalogue." Now the Third Restatement turns us
back substantially to the stripped down version of the First.3 4 Like the Third
Restatement, the European Principles of Tort Law chooses a sparer

24. Husain v. Olympic Airways, 316 F.3d 829, 836-37 (9th Cir. 2002).
25. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (1965) ("[N]egligence is conduct which falls
below the standard established by law for the protection of others against unreasonable risk of
harm.").
26. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 3 (2010)
("A person acts negligently if the person does not exercise reasonable care under all the
circumstances.").
27. Heaven v. Pender, (1883) 11 Q.B.D. 503, 509 (U.K.) (defendant "placed in such a position
with regard to another" that foresight of danger generates duty).
28. Nils Jansen, Duties and Rights in Negligence: A Comparative and HistoricalPerspective on
the EuropeanLaw ofExtracontractualLiability, 24 OxFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 443, 452 (2004).
29. Most recently re-enshrined in RESTATEMENT (THIRD) §3 cmt. d.
30. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
31. See, e.g., Richard Wright, Negligence in the Courts: Introductionand Commentary, 77 CHI.KENT L. REv. 425 (2002).
32. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS

§§ 519-20 (1938).
33. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 519-20 (1965).
34. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) §20 (two factors).
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version.
Some recent strict liability cases are charged with drama. Perhaps the
most dramatic is the recent Ninth Circuit case involving illness attributed to
radioiodine released from the Hanford, Washington facility that produced
the plutonium used in the atomic bomb dropped on Nagasaki. Judge
Schroeder decided, using the Second Restatement factors, that the
defendants' activities were abnormally dangerous.16 We confront here the
conundrum that arises when an activity becomes a part of the normal
landscape, which presumably removes it more from the classification of
abnormal dangerousness. Put a plutonium facility in every town, or many
automobiles on every street, and the plaintiff may have to show negligence.
Here is legal irony.
The theme of individual justice sounds strongly when tort law deals with
defenses based on the plaintiff s knowledge, or conduct, or both. A flock of
doctrines bears on the subject, and the difficulty that both law students and
judges have in articulating the basis for these doctrines-and the distinctions
among them-is instructive about the difficulty of the topic. An excellent
example of the clustering and overlapping of these defenses is a Michigan
Supreme Court case involving a plaintiff who plummeted into quadriplegia
when he dove off the edge of an aboveground swimming pool and hit his
head on the bottom in three-and-a-half-feet of water. This case proved so
controversial that it went into two full hearings in the Michigan Supreme
Court, with judges changing sides to an extent that one dissenter, against a
finding of no liability in the first hearing, became the writer for a majoritywhich also rejected liability-in the second hearing. In one paragraph in the
first hearing, the majority packed together concepts of obviousness,
contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and no duty.
What courts,
and students, must straighten out is a set of factual elements that includes the
question of whether the defendant fell below the standard of care, the degree
of the plaintiffs knowledge-actual or constructive-and the
reasonableness of the plaintiff's conduct. In some cases, there may be a duty
to the public at large but no duty to the individual claimant.39

35. See EUROPEAN GROUP ON TORT LAW, PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN TORT LAW: TEXT AND
CoMMENTARY art. 5:101 (2005) (closely paralleling RESTATEMENT (THIRD) §20).
36. See In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig., 534 F.3d 986 (9th Cir. 2008).
37. Glittenberg v. Doughboy Recreational Indus., Inc., 462 N.W.2d 348, 349-50 (Mich. 1990),
reh'ggranted 491 N.W.2d 208 (Mich. 1992).
38. See id. at 359.
39. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 893 note on assumption of risk 72, 73-74
(Tentative Draft No. 9, 1963) (memorandum of Lawrence H. Eldredge).
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IV.

DUTY

When we speak of the puzzles of human existence that translate
themselves into law, we are drawn inevitably to the duty question. Human
intuition, a concern for uncompensated victims, and the administrative
requirements of the court system all come together in the many quires of
paper that have been filled by commentators and judges in dealing with
events with long chains of consequences, bizarre results, or types of injury
arguably beyond the province of torts. Palsgrafo-withits combination of
human interest, odd results, and two mighty opinions-remains a
pedagogical favorite, one that I recently presented to my eight-year-old
granddaughter. At the least, we may be grateful that the Connecticut
Supreme Court concluded that "the doctrine of superseding cause no longer
serves a useful purpose in our negligence jurisprudence," 4 1 although it
continued to approve the doctrine of proximate cause.42 We may surely be
grateful that the Third Restatement says that "the term 'proximate cause"'
"is an especially poor one to describe the idea to which it is connected." 43
A group of cases that cut across many categories of the human psyche
belongs in a separate classification under the duty question. Various issues
involved with negligent infliction of emotional distress-still a controversial
The bystander witness cases
subject-arise in this group of cases."
continue to challenge courts.45 The Supreme Court has weighed in twice on
the question of fear of illness. After it turned down the Snowmen of Grand
Central 46 in their effort to recover for fear of cancer after prolonged
exposure to asbestos, the Court indicated that "fear of cancer" could be an
element of damages for workers with established asbestosis.4 7 Telling
people that they have a sexually transmissible disease, when it turns out that
this is not the fact, may be a violation of a duty to their spouses.48 Sending
test results about a positive HIV test in an unsecured fax may also be

40. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
41. Barry v. Quality Steel Prods. Inc., 820 A.2d 258, 268 (Conn. 2003).
42. See id. at 268-69.
43. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM ch. 6,
special note on proximate cause (2010).
44. A modem classic is Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593, 594 (Tex. 1993) (effectively overruling
a six-year-old precedent to "hold that there is no general duty in Texas not to negligently inflict
emotional distress").
45. An excellent example of the tensions this issue generates in courts is Thing v. LaChusa, 771
P.2d 814 (Cal. 1989), in which the various opinions identify several different positions on the
eligibility for recovery of bystanders shocked by physical trauma to third parties.
46. Metro-N. Commuter R.R. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 433 (1997) (referring to precedent on
concerns about compensating for "potential for a flood" of "trivial" claims and "unlimited and
unpredictable liability").
47. Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Ayers, 538 U.S. 135, 137 (2003) (requiring that plaintiffs show that
their "alleged fear is genuine and serious").
48. Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 616 P.2d 813 (Cal. 1980).
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grounds for liability. 9 In many of these cases, indignation at the
defendant's conduct-which usually may be found to be below the relevant
standard of care-competes with analyses based on cost curves.
Responsibility for the crimes of others seems to focus on the horrific
character of the crime, as well as the defendant's carelessness. The long
shadow of anti-Semitism figures in two cases. Using as a springboard
legislation allowing treble damages to American nationals for acts of
"international terrorism," Judge Posner found a basis for liability against
"knowing donor[s]" to Hamas in a case involving the murder at a bus stop
near Jerusalem of a teenager with dual U.S. and Israeli citizenship, who was
shot by gunmen alleged to be from Hamas.50 Posner focused, inter alia, on
the possible knowledge of donors of the fact:
[T]hat Hamas was gunning for Israelis (unlike some other terrorist
groups, Hamas's terrorism is limited to the territory of Palestine,
including Israel ... ), that Americans are frequent visitors to and
sojourners in Israel, that many U.S. citizens live in Israel ... and
that donations to Hamas, by augmenting Hamas's resources, would
enable Hamas to kill or wound, or try to kill, or conspire to kill
more people in Israel.
There is an economic strand in the argument, but one may also detect
outrage at those who give money to terrorist organizations.
A suit for the shootings of Jewish children yielded a different result in a
case in which a gunman "with publicly avowed anti-Semitic views," having
plotted his course of conduct, went on a rampage at a summer camp at a
Jewish community center.52 Labeling the occurrence "unique, shocking
and ... unforeseeable," a California appellate court said that "[d]espite the
efforts of an organization to protect individuals on its premises, a crazed
bigot who has declared 'war' on a particular group in society may find a way
to breach security measures."" In such cases, the theoretician will discern
an overlap between the duty issue and the breach of duty issue. Tugs at two
sets of heartstrings appear in the Tarasoff-type cases, where several
jurisdictions have refused to follow the lead of the California court, at least
in cases where "the victim had or should have had prior knowledge of the

49. Fla. Dept. of Corrs. v. Abril, 969 So. 2d 201, 207-08 (Fla. 2007).
50. Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., 549 F.3d 685, 694 (7th Cir. 2008).
51. Id.
52. Kadish v. Jewish Cmty. Ctrs. of Greater L.A., 5 Cal. Rptr. 3d 394, 396 (App. Ct. 2003),
appeal dismissed,cause remandedby 96 P.3d 1055 (Cal. 2004).
53. Id. at 406.
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patient's dangerousness."54
The economic loss question presents a law unto itself, but may properly
be viewed as a sub-set of the duty issue. The war here is between two great
common law suzerainties-tort and contract. More broadly, it is between
conventional bargain-and-purchase markets, with their emphasis on
expectations, and the very different kind of market involved in the concept
of injury that traditionally is tied to tort law. The duty problem aspects of
the cases are evident in the concern of courts that to allow recovery will
open up liability for an impractically long chain of harms. Stevenson v. East
Ohio Gas Co." is still a landmark, with its catalogue of the various plaintiffs
who might be eligible for recovery for the consequences of a fire.
Products liability is fertile territory for case law on economic loss. A
particularly interesting development is the worship that has been paid to a
Supreme Court decision in East River, an admiralty case. But even here,
in the Saratoga Fishing case," the Supreme Court decided that added
equipment on a vessel that sank was "other property" for which recovery
was proper in admiralty. A principal emphasis of the decisions denying
recovery has been on the ability of purchasers to bargain and on the injustice
of allowing purchasers to inflate expectations that were not reasonable-a
point strongly made by Justice Traynor in the Seely case.s So passionate
has been the attachment of courts to the economic loss rule that it has
extended to cases like Detroit Edison, in which a ruinous explosion caused a
significant amount of property damage as well as injuries to seventeen
people. 9 Some of the most troubling cases are the ones in which luck
avoids an accident that would have killed many people, but where the courts
adhere to their attachment to a doctrine of "no physical harm, no tort."60
The question of when courts can construct an affirmative duty to act
Recent
continues to fascinate at least inhabitants of the academy.
scholarship has affirmed economic and empirical arguments in favor of a no
duty rule. People at the periphery might be reluctant to help in a rescue.'
54. See Brian Ginsberg, Tarasoff at Thirty: Victim's Knowledge Shrinks the Psychotherapist's
Duty to Warn and Protect, 21 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 1, 19-32 (2005) (summarizing case
law).
55. 73 N.E.2d 200, 203-04 (Ohio Ct. App. 1946).
56. E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858 (1986) (rejecting claim for
repair costs and income loss on allegations that defective components on supertanker turbines caused
damage to the turbines themselves, crippling vessels).
57. Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J.M. Martinac & Co., 520 U.S. 875 (1997).
58. Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145 (Cal. 1965).
59. Detroit Edison Co. v. Nabco, Inc., 35 F.3d 236 (6th Cir. 1994).
60. See, e.g., Trans World Airlines v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 148 N.Y.S.2d 284, 290 (Sup. Ct.
1955) ("It is true that when the engines 'failed to operate', the planes became 'imminently
dangerous'; but the danger was 'averted'. There was no accident. The malfunctioning of the
engines had not yet turned into a misadventure.").
61. See, e.g., Marin Roger Scordato, Understanding the Absence ofa Duty to Reasonably Rescue
in American Tort Law, 82 TUL. L. REv. 1447, 1472-79 (2008).
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Professor Hyman has assembled statistics indicating that the common law
rule "has no detectible influence on the behavior of ordinary people."62 Yet,
we must take into account Professor Weinrib's observation that we cannot
count on social institutions to provide aid in the most particularized
Here is a classic example of the conflict between
instances of distress.
aspiration and ordinary behavior.
We know from DeShaney64 that the common law rule effectively
extends to government officials. However, there is some case law indicating
that duties may exist in particularly sympathetic situations-for example, a
holding that a school district could be liable for failing to protect a student
against harassment "because of his perceived sexual orientation." 6 5 Ideas of
individual autonomy, communitarianism, and simple decency compete in a
tag team wrestling match in this subject. I have not found a satisfactory
answer to the hypothetical I posed in my book on the duty to act about the
janitor who breaks a leg in an office building that is closing for the weekend
and the executive who passes by, refusing to help.66
V.

DAMAGES

The bottom line for torts lawyers is damages, and here progress towards
coherency is glacial. Pain and suffering has been with us as an item of
damages these many centuries, but how to fashion a template for the
incommensurable? Various decisions have tried to define a rule of
comparability with past cases, although this has been criticized.67 Judge
Weinstein offered a test that involved deviations from prior awards,
settlements, or verdicts.68 Professor Avraham proposed using medical costs
as the measuring rod.69 Judge Niemeyer has suggested a variety of
standards, including multiples of compensatory damages.70

62. David Hyman, Rescue Without Law: An Empirical Perspective on the Duty to Rescue, 84
TEX. L. REv. 653, 716 (2006).
63. See Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE L.J.
949 (1988).
64. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep't Soc, Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
65. L.W. ex rel. L.G. v. Toms River Reg'1 Sch. Bd. Educ., 915 A.2d 535, 539-40 (N.J. 2007).
66. MARSHALL S. SHAPO, THE DUTY To ACT 71-72 (1977).

67. See, e.g., JoEllen Lind, The End of Trial on Damages? IntangibleLosses and Comparability
Review, 51 BUFF. L. REv. 251 (2003).
68. Geressy v. Digital Equip. Corp., 980 F. Supp. 640 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
69. Ronen Avraham, Puttinga Price on Pain-and-SufferingDamages: A Critique of the Current
Approaches and a PreliminaryProposalfor Change, 100 Nw. U. L. REv. 87, 110 (2006).
70. Paul V. Niemeyer, Awards for Pain and Suffering: The IrrationalCenterpiece of Our Tort
System, 90 VA. L. REV. 1401, 1417-19 (2004).
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The category of "moral damage" has many meanings in other
countries 7 and indeed appears to have attained a kind of constitutional
status in Italy. 72 The case of non-economic loss is one of the great puzzles,
involving as it does compensation for things that cannot be bought on any
legal market. It is an embolus in the stream of conventional economic
analysis. An interesting recent entry on the subject is the broad definition of
non-economic loss in the statutes setting up the Victim Compensation Fund
for September the 11th.n
Punitive damages, although awarded infrequently, have become a
subject of much discussion in the commentaries and also, remarkably, in at
least nine Supreme Court decisions. Two of the most recent ones raise the
question of whether the Court's entry into this field has been one of its more
recent self-inflicted wounds. Illustrative of the folly is Justice Stevens's
declaration in the Oregon smoking case that the "distinction between taking
third-party harm into account in order to assess the reprehensibility of the
defendant's conduct" and "doing so in order to punish the defendant
'directly' was a "nuance" that "elude[d]" him.74 Then, in the Exxon Valdez
case, Justice Stevens mercilessly exposed the defects in the one-to-one ratio
favored by Justice Souter for the majority, which reduced what initially was
a $5 billion award, cut down to $2.5 billion by the court of appeals, to a little
over a half billion. 5 With his customary emphasis on the facts, Justice
Stevens characterized the event as "Exxon's decision to permit a lapsed
alcoholic to command a supertanker carrying tens of millions of gallons of
crude oil through the treacherous waters of Prince William Sound, thereby
endangering all of the individuals who depended on the Sound for their
livelihoods."
Many rationales have been advanced for punitive damages." The idea
of societal punitive damages advanced by Professor Sharkey is one of the
most interesting efforts at justifying a form of compensation that goes

71. See, e.g., Jorge A. Vargas, Moral Damages Under the Civil Law of Mexico. Are These
Damages Equivalent to US. Punitive Damages?, 35 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 183, 230-41
(2003) (identifying a different meaning of the term); Guido Alpa, Foreign Law in International
Legal Practice: An Italian Perspective, 36 TEX. INT'L L.J. 495, 501 (2001) (defining the term as
"correspond[ing] to the 'pain and suffering' of common law").
72. See Cass. civ., sez. un., 11 novembre 2008, n. 26974.
73. See September 1Ith Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, Pub. L. 107-42, § 402(7), 115 Stat.
237 (2001) (specifically listing approximately a dozen types of loss, with a residual clause for "all
other nonpecuniary losses of any kind or nature").
74. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 360 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
75. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2632-34 (2005).
76. See id. at 2638 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
77. See, e.g., Dan Markel, Retributive Damages: A Theory of Punitive Damages as Intermediate
Sanction, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 239 (2009); Dan Markel How Should Punitive Damages Work?, 157
U. PA. L. REv. 1383 (2009).
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beyond the harms proved by the individual plaintiff to herself 78 One of the
puzzles of human existence that transcribes itself in tort law is the difficulty
of separating individual compensation from retribution on behalf of society.
VI. FUNCTIONALITY OF TORT LAW

As Dean Green insisted beginning more than two generations ago, tort
law is functional.79 Its application depends on the realities of the
environments in which it is imposed. Medical care-the general subject a
special pivot of political discussion over the last year-presents many
examples of difficulties in defining the standard of care. One commentator
has attacked the use of custom as "the central determinant of liability in
medical malpractice."so He has pointed out that custom tends in practice to
generate "overcompliance" with various types of precautions.81 The
phenomenon, he says, "will influence behavior in such a way that physicians
themselves will soon forget whether a particular practice originated" in
"defensive medicine" or as "a response to marketing efforts"-for example,
by sellers of new medical technologies-or as "a clinical desideratum"-that
is, other practitioners "adopt[ing] a new procedure," with other physicians
"follow[ing] the herd." 82 Another observer, focusing on the problem of the
standard of care in managed care, concludes that the direction of the
evolution of the standard "remains to be defined," mentioning the tensions
between "tort theory versus contract theory, traditional standards versus
variable standards, and patient advocacy versus cost-containment."83
Although the cost of medical malpractice has been overemphasized within
the context of health care costs in general, the problem is quantitatively an
important one. The response of the law affects not only costs, but,
presumably, the level of care that is given, in the context of statistics
indicating that "at least 44,000 and perhaps as many as a 98,000" people die

78. See, e.g., Catherine M. Sharkey, PunitiveDamages as Societal Damages, 13 YALE L.J. 347,
351-52 (2003).
79. See, e.g., LEON GREEN ET AL., CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS (2d ed. 1977) (including a

chapter on "Actions and Defenses When Interests Are Harmed by Traffic or Transportation," with
such subheadings as "Horse and Buggy Traffic," "Fixed Track Vehicles," and "Air and Waterway
Traffic").
80. James Gibson, DoctrinalFeedback and (Un)reasonable Care, 94 VA. L. REV. 1641, 1658
(2008).
81. Id. at 1659.
82. Id. at 1670-71.
83. Charles Markowitz, Medical Standard of Care Jurisprudence as Evolutionary Process:
Implications Under Managed Care, 2 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHiCS 59, 78 (2001).
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each year as a result of medical errors.
Sometimes literally at trench level, the definition of the standard of care
with respect to various kinds of visitors to land remains controversial.
Professor Sugarman has contrasted the obligations of commercial actors and
ordinary homeowners.85 Yet, the Third Restatement has opted to do away
with the traditional landowner categories, except for a small
subclassification involving adult "flagrant trespassers."
Products liability is a superb example of the interaction between tort law
and culture. The many tensions arising from conflicting consumer desires,
the perceived need for innovation, and the trail of injuries left by hazardous
products combine to produce a unique set of tensions in the law. It is not a
coincidence that over the decades since restatements began to be developed,
the single provision that occupied the most discussion on the floor of the
American Law Institute was the provision in the Products Liability
Restatement on defect, particularly design defect.
The very substantial
change between the Second and Third Restatements on this topic88 is
symbolic of the arguments rooted in economics and politics that swirl
around what we are pleased to call the law. The question of how to make
markets more efficient parallels the question of what fairness means-both
in the party-centered sense and the broader social sense. Sometimes in the
background and sometimes in the foreground is a phenomenon I have
emphasized for a long time: the tight linkage of products law to the way that
products are portrayed to consumers, with the idea of portrayal being
broadly defined.89
Sport is a central recreation in American life, and our assumptions that
referees and leagues will work out problems of physical harm arising from
violent combat have largely kept sports injuries out of the judicial process.
However, when cases of that sort do come to court, they produce some
interesting analyses with results that tend toward the philosophy of "let 'em
play." A remarkable decision by the California Supreme Court on an injury
caused by a bean ball features the statement, "[fjor better or worse, being
intentionally thrown at is a fundamental part and inherent risk of the sport of

84. To ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM 1, 26 (Linda T. Kohn et al. eds.,
2000).
85. See Stephen D. Sugarman, Rethinking Tort Doctrine: Visions of a Restatement (Fourth) of
Torts, 50 UCLA L. REV. 585 (2002).
86. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORT: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM

§§

51-52

(Tentative Draft No. 6, 2009).
87. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(b) (1998) (requiring claimants to show
a reasonable alternative design).
88. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) defines a broad principle of strict
liability for products in a "defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer"
without differentiating between or among defect categories.
89. See, e.g., Marshall S. Shapo, A Representational Theory of Consumer Protection: Doctrine,
Function,andLegal Liabilityfor Product Disappointment,60 VA. L. REV. 1109 (1974).
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baseball." 90 It is not an extension of the philosophy in such a rule to declare
that in professional football, as Judge Matsch put it, "[t]he NFL has
substituted the morality of the battlefield for that of the playing field, and the
'restraints of civilization' have been left on the sidelines." 91 In another
setting filled with risk, but not that of injury from competitors, generally
skiers proceed at their own risk-a rule codified not only in cases using the
theory of primary assumption of risk, 92 but also in skiers' responsibility
acts.93 It should be added that what's sour sauce for the athlete is also sour
sauce for the spectator. Generally, a baseball fan cannot sue for being hit by
a foul ball.
I have been interested for a long time in the parallels and overlaps
between tort law and civil rights. The very concept of a "constitutional tort,"
which I coined in 1965,94 defines an area of overlap, while setting up hurdles
that claimants suing officials must jump before they can move into liability
territory. A president of the United States managed barely to escape from
the law, if not from a broad range of social criticism, for a brief episode of
sexual predation involving a State employee; there is a substantial dollop of
human interest in the fact that the judge who enabled his escape was a
former law student of his who obviously found his conduct disgusting. 95
But generally, "civil rights principles have migrated into torts," "now
operat[ing] as a modest supplement to civil rights protection provided by
state and federal statutes." 9 6

We continually discover the limits of tort law. In the environment, it
provides many doctrinal bases for liability in cases involving the spillover of
one possessor's activities onto the land of another. There is a boomlet in the
law reviews for tort suits on global warming, and even some speculation in
the media that this could be the next mega-tort issue. 97 However, the current
political situation, and the limited resources of courts, suggest that ultimately
that task will have to be left to domestic legislation and intergovernmental
One set of problems of great quantitative and social
negotiation.
90. Avila v. Citrus Cmty. Coll. Dist., 131 P.3d 383, 393 (Cal. 2006).
91. Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, 435 F. Supp. 352, 358 (D. Colo. 1977), rev'd, 601 F.2d 516
(10th Cir. 1979).
92. See, e.g., Smith v. Seven Springs Farm, Inc., 716 F.2d 1002 (3d Cir. 1983).
93. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1101 (2010).
94. Marshall S. Shapo, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape and the FrontiersBeyond, 60 Nw.
U. L. REV. 277 (1965).
95. See Jones v. Clinton, 990 F. Supp. 657 (E.D. Ark. 1998).
96. Martha Chamallas, Discrimination and Outrage: The Migrationfrom Civil Rights to Tort
Law, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2115, 2180 (2007).
97. See John Schwartz, Courts Emerging as Battlefieldfor Fights Over Climate Change, N.Y.
TIMEs, Jan. 27, 2010, at Al, available at 2010 WLNR 1706147.
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significance reaching beyond our national boundaries-that of mass
violations of civil rights, even mass murder-appears as a practical matter to
be a subject for political remediation and not judicially created remedies.
In the area of romance, sex, and marriage, tort law as a written law tends
to stay far in the background. I know of no reported cases on date rape.
There is at least one reported tort case on battered spouses," but many
factors conspire to keep that wrenching topic out of the civil courts.
Moreover, the anti-heartbalm legislation, and the spirit behind it, has tended
to relegate seduction-type suits to private ordering (or disordering).99 At the
same time, as I have indicated, misrepresentation about freedom from
communicable disease, or even silence about contagion, may be grounds for
suit.
In our early twenty-first century setting, tort law is a striking example of
the complex, and highly specified, product that we are willing to call justice.
Ideas of communitarianism and individualism parallel each other and
sometimes reverse positions. On the one hand, Cochran and Ackerman have
commented that "[clommunitarians obviously are concerned that tort law
encourage parties to take steps to protect their fellow citizens, and the risk of
tort liability can encourage such care." 00 On the other hand, ironically,
proponents of risk-utility analysis are in effect supporting a form of
communitarianism by their very choice of that concept, which emphasizes
the achievement of the greatest good for the greatest number.o' An
important, related question is how much we wish to preserve the
individualization of justice, for which tort law is a major social mechanism,
and how far we wish to go along the line of legislatively-enacted
compensation systems, which deemphasize individualization and employ
schedules. Another related question is how closely we wish to focus on
individual justice between the parties-which in the terms of current
discourse tends to mean corrective justice-as contrasted with an approach
that stresses the broader social effects of decisions on personal injuries.
A most striking combination of various kinds of approaches appears in
the September 11th Fund. I have written at some length on the diverse

98. Cusseaux v. Pickett, 652 A.2d 789 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1994).
99. See, e.g., William R. Corbett, A Somewhat Modest Proposalto Prevent Adultery and Save
Families: Two Old Torts Looking for a New Career, 33 ARiz. ST. L.J. 985, 1013-24 (2001)
(summarizing arguments against allowing such suits).
100. See ROBERT F. COCHRAN JR. & ROBERT M. ACKERMAN, LAW AND COMMUNITY: THE CASE
OF TORTS 225-26 (2004).
101. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 291 (1965) (risk unreasonable if it outweighs
utility); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM

§3

cmt. e

(2010) ("risk-benefit" test "where the 'risk' is the overall level of the foreseeable risk created by the
actor's conduct and the 'benefit' is the advantages that the actor or others gain if the actor refrains
from taking precautions").
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features of that legislation. 10 2 It constructs a compensation system that in
some ways evens out certain kinds of damages categories among all the
claimants in this unique set of cases.1 03 At the same time, it borrows
wholesale many ideas from the tort rules that key damages to income. In
another set of antinomies, it sets up rather precise tables for awards to people
who fall into certain family and income categories,' 1 while at the same time
giving discretion to the Special Master to particularize awards to
individuals. o
VII.

IMPARTIALITY AND JUDGMENT

If justice is impartiality,' 06 then tort law is at the center of a great
struggle. Can judges be impartial, or neutral? Learned Hand, eulogizing
Cardozo, suggested this not only as an ideal, but as a true possibility for
judges. And yet, if "the wise man is the detached man," 0 7 judges must
consider that "[o]ur convictions, our outlook, the whole make-up of our
thinking, which we cannot help bringing to the decision of every question, is
the creature of our past." And they must remember that "into our past have
been woven all sorts of frustrated ambitions with their envies, and of hopes
of preferment with their corruptions, which, long since forgotten, still
determine our conclusions." 08
With all of these obstacles to intellectual detachment, what can we say
about the state of American tort law? We can say that perhaps more than
ever before, its condition is one of argument and controversy. The very
phrase "tort reform" is proof enough of its ideological character.
As educators, torts teachers can only hope to instill in our students-and
in any judges who may read our writing-a commitment to good judgment.

102. See generally MARSHALL S. SHAPO, COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF TERRORISM (2005)
[hereinafter SHAPO, COMPENSATION]

103. See 28 C.F.R. § 104.44 (2002) (equal amounts for economic loss).
104. See id. §§ 104.43, 104.45.
105. See, e.g., Air Transportation Safety and Systems Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42 §
405(b)(1)(B), 115 Stat. 230 (2001) (empowering Special Master to determine compensation "based
on the harm to the claimant, the facts of the claim, and the individual circumstances of the
claimant"); SHAPO, COMPENSATION, supra note 102, at 230 (regarding his role as Special Master,
Kenneth Feinberg told a reporter, "The law gives me unbelievable discretion. It gives me discretion
to do whatever I want. So I will." (quoting Elizabeth Kolbert, The Calculator,NEW YORKER, Nov.
25, 2002, at 41,48)).
106. See e.g., BRIAN BARRY, JUSTICE AS IMPARTIALITY (1995).
107. See Learned Hand, Mr. Justice Cardozo, 39 COLUM. L. REv. 9, 10; 52 HARV. L. REV. 361,
362; 48 YALE L.J. 379, 380 (1939).
108. See Learned Hand, supra note 107, at 39 COLUM. L. REV. at 10-11; 52 HARV. L. REV. at
362-63; 48 YALE L.J. at 380-81.
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Good judgment is in short supply, not only at the bench and bar, but in many
risky activities of life.
Where torts teachers have to use our judgment neurons in our own
bailiwick is in the cases that are famous for their difficulty. I adduce
Palsgrafj For many years, I have taught that case as an argument in which I
play both Cardozo and Andrews. Sometimes, in the middle of my argument
with myself, I convince myself, alternatively, that each opinion has the
better of it. And so the state of American tort law is an argumentative state,
and the choices we make require .. .judgment.
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